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NOTES
STATE BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, "GOOD
MORAL CHARACTER" AND FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
It is axiomatic that the lawyer should possess personal qualifica-
tions commensurate with holding positions of trust and responsibility.
It is equally obvious that the lawyer must be willing to protect and up-
hold the laws of his state and nation. To these ends, states have long
required those seeking to enter the profession of law to establish their
"good moral character."' Traditionally, this broad term has embodied
personal characteristics such as "honesty," "integrity," "candor," and
the like. Recently, with national concern over the communist move-
ment, many states have attempted to incorporate within this concept
the idea that the individual must adhere to and agree to work within
the traditional framework of our society.2 For most states the modern
definition of "good moral character" seems to have two parts: one is
ethical in the traditional sense, the other requires the individual to
hold political views consistent with our form of government. To es-
tablish the latter, the applicant for admission to the bar is often re-
quired to state that he does not advocate violent overthrow of the
government and to answer questions otherwise pertaining to his polit-
ical beliefs and associations.' Since this second facet of "good moral
character" is related to free speech and assembly, its use by the states
as an admission requirement presents a potential conflict with rights
guaranteed by the first amendment4 and made applicable to the states
by incorporation into the fourteenth.5
This conflict between individual rights of free expression and asso-
1. "All states, by statute, rule, or practice, require that the moral character
of all applicants for admission be approved prior to admission to the bar." Brown
& Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 480 n.1
(1953). See, e.g., Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 8.01 (Vernon 1949). See also Jackson, Char-
acter Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 305 (1951).
2. A few states have adopted non-communist or "loyalty" oaths. The majority
inquire into the applicant's political beliefs and associations and relate the infor-
mation obtained to "good moral character." Some states do neither. See generally
Brown & Fassett, supra note 1.
3. See generally Brown & Fassett, supra note 1, where the authors detail the
various procedures by which state bar committees inquire into the applicant's
political beliefs and associations.
4. See note 8 infra.
5. See note 9 infra.
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ciation and admission requirements seems to underlie two recent
Supreme Court decisions 6 reversing state determinations excluding
applicants from the practice of law for their failure to prove "good
moral character." One applicant was a former member of the Com-
munist Party; the other refused to permit inquiry into his political
beliefs. In neither case did the state argue that the applicant, in order
to establish his "good moral character," was required to prove himself
fit both politically and ethically. In neither case did the Court attempt
to resolve the conflict. Rather, the Court reviewed the evidence and
held the state action violated due process. This treatment makes it
necessary, before analyzing these cases and assessing their signifi-
cance, to discuss briefly the general requirements placed on the states
by the fourteenth amendment and the extent to which they have
limited state bar proceedings in the past.
The fourteenth amendment, through both the due process and equal
protection clauses, restrains state action that unreasonably infringes
individual rights and liberties.7 Those rights guaranteed by the first
amendment,8 freedom of expression and association, are made applica-
ble to the states by the fourteenth. 9 For the most part, when review-
ing a determination under the due process clause, the Court has as-
sumed that the state action was reasonable and upheld it, unless it
was clearly arbitrary or lacked any reasonable basis in fact.10 These
6. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person.. . the equal protection of the laws."
8. U.S. Const. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble .... 1" In two recent decisions by the Supreme Court there appears the
assertion that free political belief and association are individual rights pro-
tected by the first amendment. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188
(1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
9. This proposition was first sustained by the Court in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See also Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (religion); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (press); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (press); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (speech). Cf.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
10. The textual statement refers to that area of due process sometimes termed
"substantive," where the question is whether a state regulatory measure, adopted
in the public interest, is invalid because it conflicts with individual rights of
liberty and property. State action in order to be sustained "must be exercised
for an end which is in fact public" and the means employed must be reasonably
related thereto. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n., 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
However, the Court in determining the validity of a regulatory measure will grant
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are the normal limitations of due process. Generally, where the right
alleged to have been violated is one guaranteed by the first amend-
ment, no greater limitation has been placed on the state.11 However,
there have been indications by the Court that these rights should be
given a "preferred position" in deciding whether the requirements of
due process have been met. 2 The reasoning is that these rights are so
important to the maintenance of a democratic society that their in-
fringement can only be justified where the state shows some necessity
for its action. Thus, if a "preferred" test is employed, state action
would not satisfy the requirements of due process merely because it is
not arbitrary.";
The state in licensing attorneys is limited by operation of the four-
teenth amendment.14 Even though a state may prescribe its own
peculiar standards of qualification and proficiency, due process re-
quires them to be not unreasonable and their application uniform and
every possible presumption in favor of the state. United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
537-38 (1934).
11. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1925). See Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261 (1952).
12. The doctrine that first amendment rights enjoy a "preferred position"
under the fourteenth amendment was first enunciated by Justice Stone in a foot-
note to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Basically, the idea suggested by this footnote was that, although legislation reg-
ulating ordinary transactions would be presumed reasonable and valid, perhaps
this same presumption should not operate when legislation conflicted with specific
constitutional prohibitions made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Subsequently the idea that first amendment rights should be given a "pre-
ferred position" has appeared in a number of cases. See Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ;
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (dissenting opinion); Minersville District v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 566, 604 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
The doctrine of "preferred position" has not been fully adopted by the Court,
however, and has on several occasions been expressly repudiated. See Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 540-44 (1951) (concurring opinion); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1949) (concurring opinion); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
For further discussion of the doctrine of "preferred position" see Dumbauld,
The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 127-32 (1957); Mason, The Core
of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms," 65
Yale L.J. 597 (1956).
13. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
14. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). But see In re Lockwood, 154
U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (practice
of law not within the privilege and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment); In re Anastaplo, 3 Ili.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 946 (1955) (exclusion from the bar raises no federal question).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
fair.15 The Court, while recognizing these limitations on state action,
has in the past assumed the state acted reasonably and has shown
marked reluctance to disturb decisions excluding applicants from the
bar. Generally, its position has been that responsibility for licensing
attorneys rests solely with the states.16 Thus, absent a conflict with
Bill of Rights guarantees incorporated into it, the fourteenth amend-
ment has imposed few limitations on state bar proceedings. 17 How-
ever, as previously mentioned, current admission requirements, i.e.,
the double-edged definition of "good moral character," present a po-
tential conflict with rights guaranteed by the first amendment. 8 It is,
therefore, necessary to determine what significance the inclusion of
political fitness into the term "good moral character" has on the re-
sults reached in the principal cases, and to ascertain whether addi-
tional limitations will be imposed on the states because of its inclusion.
The Schware case,'9 where exclusion from the practice of law was
based primarily on former membership in the Communist Party,20
illustrates the conflict that may exist between admission requirements
and rights guaranteed by the first amendment. The Supreme Court,
however, had other grounds on which to base its decision and made
no attempt to resolve this conflict.21 New Mexico, although conceding
Schware had established an excellent reputation since leaving the
Party in 1940, presumed any former communist was a person of
"questionable character," and found that Schware had failed to estab-
lish his fitness for the bar.22 The Supreme Court reviewed all the
15. Cf. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379-80 (1866); Ex parte
Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856). The same requirements are imposed
on the states in licensing other professions. See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165
(1923) (dentist); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (doctor).
16. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570-71 (1945); Selling v. Radford, 243
U.S. 46, 50 (1916); Keeley v. Evans, 271 Fed. 520, 522 (D. Ore 1921), appeal
dismissed, 257 U.S. 667 (1922).
17. Research has not disclosed any case in which the Supreme Court has, prior
to the principal cases, by application of the fourteenth amendment reversed a
state determination excluding an applicant from admission to the bar. See cases
cited in note 14 supra.
18. See note 8 supra.
19. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
20. Other evidence unfavorable to Schware was his prior use of aliases and
record of arrests. However, since he had allegedly used aliases to procure em-
ployment where his Jewish ancestry might have proved detrimental and since the
arrests did not result in convictions or even indictments, these factors were useful
only to support the real ground for denying Schware admittance.
21. 353 U.S. at 243-44 n.13.
22. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 319, 291 P.2d 607, 617
(1955). At the time Schware sought admission to the bar, New Mexico required
applicants to be of "good moral character." See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8 (1953)
and Rules Governing Admission to the Bar appended thereto, Rule I(1). The
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evidence and, emphasizing that such a presumption precluded the in-
dividual from ever establishing his "good moral character," declared
the state action arbitrary. - 3 Since the Court was able to reach this
conclusion either by reviewing the evidence or attacking the presump-
tion made, the presence of a conflict between first amendment rights
and the modern definition of "good moral character" does not seem
determinative of the conclusion reached. Rather than impose new
limitations on the state because of the presence of first amendment
rights, the Court, by basing its decision on the arbitrariness of the
state's action, put into practice a principle long recognized, namely,
that state bar proceedings are limited by operation of the fourteenth
amendment.24 Therefore the Schwctre case seems to be merely a judi-
cial determination that the nornal requirements of due process are
not satisfied when admission to the bar is denied an applicant solely
because of his past membership in the Communist Party. This case
is significant because it marks the first instance in which the Court,
by applying the fourteenth amendment, reversed a state decision
holding an applicant unqualified for the practice of law.25 Perhaps the
special concern of the Court for first amendment rights was a factor
prompting it to hear the case. It does not seem reasonable to assume
that the Court by this decision has indicated a willingness to review
all state determinations whenever the applicant claims his exclusion
violated the requirements of due process.
The result reached in the Konigsberg case26 can be fully understood
only after a detailed analysis of the reasoning employed and the facts
presented. California requires an applicant for the bar to establish
his "good moral character" and to prove that he does not advocate the
violent overthrow of the government.27 The state denied Konigsberg
admission because of doubts whether he was a communist raised by
his refusal to answer questions concerning his political beliefs and
held that he failed to satisfy either requirement.28 Again, although
statute now in force requires the applicant, in addition, to swear that he is not a
member of the Communist Party. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8 and Rules Govern-
ing Admission to the Bar, Rule 1 (5) (Supp. 1957).
23. 353 U.S. at 246-47. The concurring justices limited their decision to an
attack on the presumption made by the state. Id. at 250.
24. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
25. See note 17 supra.
26. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
27. Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code Ann. §§ 6060 (c), 6064.1 (Deering Supp. 1957).
28. The decision of the California Supreme Court in reviewing the bar pro-
ceedings is unreported. Besides Konigsberg's refusal to answer, certain other
evidence unfavorable to the applicant was introduced at the hearings. One wit-
ness identified him as having attended meetings of the Communist Party in 1941;
it was shown that he had refused to answer questions concerning his political
beliefs when called before the California Un-American Activities Committee; and
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rights of free political beliefs and associations were claimed to have
been violated, the case was decided on other grounds.20 The Supreme
Court based its decision solely on the sufficiency of the evidence, hold-
ing the state's determination arbitrary in light of (a) applicant's ex-
press statement that he did not advocate overthrow of the govern-
ment and (b) numerous testimonials indicating his good reputation. 0
On first impression it is difficult to see how the Court, assuming the
admission requirements valid and recognizing the burden to be on
the applicant, could have found the state unreasonable in concluding
that Konigsberg had failed to establish his fitness for the bar when
he obstructed inquiry into his political beliefs. This, however, was
the clear holding of the Court.
To decide this case by a normal application of the fourteenth
amendment to state action, it was necessary for the Court to declare
that no adverse inference about Konigsberg's qualifications could be
drawn from his refusal to answer questions concerning his political
beliefs. This conclusion was possible only because California failed
to define what was included within its standard, "good moral char-
acter." 1 The state maintained that Konisgberg's refusal to answer
tended to support an inference that he was a member of the Com-
munist Party and, thus, a person of "bad moral character."' 3 Califor-
nia compels the applicant for admission to the bar to establish his
fitness in both the areas embraced by the modern definition of "good
moral character," but it segregates the two aspects of that term by
requirements that are separate and distinct.3  Having made this
separation, it would have been more logical had the state claimed
that the inference to be drawn related to its non-advocacy require-
ment, i.e., as raising doubts concerning the validity of applicant's
statement that he did not advocate violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. This would seem especially true since the state in presenting
its argument had defined its requirement, "good moral character,"
as embodying only ethical concepts.3 4 This, however, was not done
and the Court, adopting the state's definition, had to decide what pos-
editorials were introduced in which he had violently attacked public officials.
These factors, however, do not appear to have been the real basis on which the
state refused to grant Konigsberg admission to the bar. For a partial record of
the state bar proceedings see 353 U.S. at 284-309 (dissenting opinion).
29. 353 U.S. at 261-62.
30. Id. at 273-74.
31. Apparently, California defined this term in its argument as including
"honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the
state and nation." Id. at 263.
32. Id. at 270.
33. See text supported by note 27 supra.
34. See note 31 supra.
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sible evidentiary value applicant's refusal to declare his political be-
liefs could have in determining whether he was truthful, honest, and
possessed of integrity.35 Since political beliefs and associations, even
those of the communist, would seem to have no direct correlation to
an individual's ethical qualities,39 the Court could logically maintain
that, "obviously," no unfavorable inference as to "truthfulness, can-
dor, or moral character in general" could be drawn from Konigsberg's
refusal to answer, if he believed in good faith that the Constitution
gave him this right.3 7 Once the refusal to answer was made an evi-
dentiary nullity, nothing remained to refute the evidence introduced
by Konigsberg attesting his good character or to impeach his state-
ment of non-advocacy3 and the Court could conclude that the state
had no reasonable basis for finding that he had failed to qualify
himself for admission to the bar.3 9 Only by assuming that the Court
viewed the inference drawn from his refusal to answer as relating
solely to "good moral character" as traditionally defined can the
Konigsberg case be explained as a normal determination under the
due process clause. However, merely to detail the holding of the
Court and describe the reasoning by which its conclusion was reached
would be to overlook a significant aspect of this decision.
The conflict in the instant case between first amendment rights and
admission requirements seems too obvious to be ignored. Although
the Court expressly refrained from resolving this conflict, and did
not question the validity of the state admission requirements, there
are strong indications throughout the opinion that to require an ap-
plicant to prove his political fitness in order to establish his "good
35. 353 U.S. at 264.
36. This suggestion stems from several recent works that have attempted to
depict the individual and analyze the reasons behind his joining the Communist
Party. Throughout it appears that the average member is a person of above
average intelligence and a high degree of social conscience, who joined the Party
with a sincere desire to eradicate existing social evils and work toward producing
a new and more perfect society. However misguided might be this ideal or the
method chosen for its accomplishment, this person could appear to the community
as reputable as a social worker. Outwardly at least he would seem to have little
difficulty in establishing his "good moral character," as that term has been tradi-
tionally employed. See generally Draper, The Roots of American Communism
(1957); Ernst & Loth, Report on the American Communist (1952). See also The
God That Failed (Crossman ed. 1949); Fast, The Naked God (1957).
37. 353 U.S. at 270.
38. The Court had little difficulty in discarding the other evidence unfavorable
to Konigsberg that was introduced at the hearing. See note 28 supra. It declared
that, even had applicant been a member of the Communist Party in 1941, he could
not be excluded on that fact alone, citing the Schware case. 353 U.S. at 267. The
editorials were seen as fair comment and criticism of political officials. Id. at
268-69.
39. Id. at 273-74.
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moral character" may infringe on rights guaranteed by the first
amendment.40 Further, the apparent willingness of the Court to
afford protection to these rights must be emphasized in assessing the
importance of this decision. Although the Court refused to pass on
the validity of Konigsberg's claim that the Constitution prevented
the state from inquiring into his political beliefs and associations, it
did hold that no adverse inference could be drawn from his failure
to respond. The effect therefore was the same as if there had been a
clear determination that political beliefs were in fact privileged. Of
more significance, however, is language which indicates that a state
in selecting members for its bar may not act in an arbitrary or un-
reasonable manner, nor interfere with free political expression or
association.41 This statement, although clearly dictum, suggests that
first amendment rights should be given a preferred position in deter-
mining whether state action satisfies the requirements of due process.
Its presence may be explained because the state attempted to incor-
porate ideas of political fitness into its "good moral character" re-
quirement.
What significance can be attached to the results reached in these
two decisions? Since both involved a conflict between first amend-
ment rights and state admission requirements, and because of the
indications in the opinions that these rights deserve special protec-
tion, it might be said that the Schware case makes past membership
in the Communist Party irrelevant in determining whether an ap-
plicant is qualified for admission to the bar and that, after the
Konigsberg case, an individual may refuse to state his political be-
liefs without fear of exclusion. However, to deduce such broad gen-
eral rules would seem unwarranted. The Court neither attacked ad-
mission requirements nor decided that an individual's political beliefs
and associations could not be considered in determining his fitness
for the bar. The only conclusion reached by the Court in each in-
stance was that the state had acted arbitrarily in light of the evidence
presented. Therefore it would seem wiser to accord these decisions
no more direct importance than representing narrow holdings on
their particular facts. Of more significance are the dicta which sug-
gest that the former latitude allowed states in selecting members of
the bar will be limited when the applicant is required to prove his
political fitness, and the fact that the Court failed to review the evi-
dence of past membership and refusal to answer as relating to the
second aspect of "good moral character." In each case the evidence
was reviewed solely to determine whether there was any reasonable
basis for finding that the applicant lacked honesty, candor, and good
40. Id. at 263, 269, 273.
41. Id. at 273.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss2/4
NOTES
character in general. It is submitted that this occurred because the
states failed to define "good moral character" properly and also failed
to present the real issues involved to the Court for determination.
The real issue is whether a state may require an applicant for ad-
mission to the bar to prove his political as well as his ethical or moral
fitness. To reach a decision in terms of this issue, the Court would
be required to balance a state interest against those individual rights
guaranteed by the first amendment. 42 Before any conclusion can be
made to what extent these rights will impose limitations on state bar
proceedings, i.e., before a balance can be reached, the states must
clearly define their interests.
A state in licensing attorneys may protect its citizens and its own
sovereignty. It has a vital interest in excluding applicants who would
be unable to discharge those fiduciary obligations imposed on an at-
torney, or who would not uphold the laws and constitution of the
state and nation.43 A state may, therefore, compel the individual to
prove that he has satisfied requirements reasonably related to this
interest. Since the individual who fails to sustain this burden may
be excluded from the bar, it should follow that a state may inquire
into any fact pertinent in determining whether these requirements
have been met. The question, then, is whether political beliefs of the
applicant are pertinent in deciding whether he is qualified to practice
law. It has been recognized that the Communist Party, in advocating
the violent overthrow of governments, makes no attempt to work
within the constitutional framework of our society, and believes in
destruction of the judicial system as one method of fostering its ul-
timate goal." It would seem that a state could exclude from the prac-
tice of law any person who, because of a belief in these principles,
would obstruct justice if given the opportunity.45 The Court has
previously held that inquiry into political beliefs is proper in deter-
mining whether a person is qualified to teach in state institutions. 46
Since the lawyer occupies a position equally as sensitive as that held
42. See note 8 supra.
43. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). (See also Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1957) (concurring opinion).
44. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561-66 (1951) (concurring opinion);
American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 425-26 (1950)
(concurring opinion); Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C.
§ 841 (Supp. 1956).
45. See Sacher v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd and decree
modified, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
46. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); see Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S.
551 (1956); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); cf. Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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by the educator, it would seem that this same criterion could be used
in bar proceedings. If this is true, then political beliefs and associa-
tions would be pertinent in deciding whether an applicant is qualified
for admission to the bar. It should be noted, however, that exclusion
or admittance should not be based solely on whether the individual is
or was a member of the Communist Party; membership is only evi-
dence indicating his present political beliefs. Rather, the question to
be decided is whether the individual because of his present political
beliefs is unable to prove that he will uphold the laws of the state and
nation and, therefore, would constitute a threat to a valid state
interest. It would seem that a person unable to do so could be properly
excluded.
Because the real issue involved in these cases has not been decided
by the Court, it is difficult to determine what constitutional limitations
will be imposed when a state, to protect a valid interest, excludes an
applicant from the bar on the basis of his political beliefs. The state
will, obviously, be limited by the usual requirements of due process, 47
i.e., requirements must be reasonably related to a valid state interest,48
the applicant must be accorded a fair hearing in which the subject
under inquiry is his present ability to satisfy these requirements,4
and, finally, the conclusion of the state must be reasonable in light of
all the evidence50 Because of the dicta appearing in the principal
cases, the important question is what further limitations will be im-
posed on the state. It is possible that first amendment rights will be
given special protection and a state will be required to show some
necessity-instead of showing merely that its action was not unrea-
sonable-for denying an applicant admission to the bar on the basis
of his political beliefs. However, it is submitted that if the state in-
terest to be protected in excluding an individual who holds political
beliefs inimical to a constitutional form of government is understood
and clearly defined, if the admission requirements adopted assure pro-
tection of this interest, and if the real issues involved are presented to
the Court for its determination, no further limitations than the
normal requirements of due process will be imposed. Moreover, un-
less the Court declares that a state cannot place the burden of proving
political fitness on the applicant, even if a preferred position is given
first amendment rights, it would seem that by properly defining and
acting to protect its valid interest a state would, in effect, satisfy any
requirement of "necessity." If this supposition is correct, the question
47. See note 10 supra and text supported thereby.
48. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
49. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
50. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg V.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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of communist affiliation would become an evidentiary determination
of the individual applicant's ability to prove that his present political
beliefs presented no danger to this valid state interest. However, until
the state interest is properly defined, the reason for incorporating
ideas of political fitness into its "good moral character" requirement
is fully explained, and the real issue involved in the principal cases is
presented to the Court, no clear definition of the permissible limits of
state bar proceedings can be expected.
Perhaps more than either of the principal cases, the Application of
Patterson" illustrates the confused results obtained when a state fails
to define the interest protected by refusing to license an individual
holding political beliefs inimical to a constitutional form of govern-
ment and fails to adopt admission requirements related to it. In this
instance, although it seems clear that the real reason Oregon excluded
Patterson was his membership and leadership in the Communist
Party from 1946 to 1949, and although it seems there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding that his present political beliefs consti-
tuted a threat to a valid state interest,2 the sole basis for the state ac-
tion was that applicant failed to establish his "good moral character"
as traditionally defined53 Noting from many sources the aims of the
Communist Party, the state found that applicant lied in declaring that
neither he, nor the Party, advocated the overthrow of the government
by force and violence and therefore held that he failed to prove his
"good moral character." On rehearing after the Supreme Court va-
cated and remanded,54 Oregon affirmed this decision and found it rea-
sonable. Because of the method by which the state excluded Patter-
son from the bar, it is difficult to predict what result will be reached
if this case is again reviewed by the Supreme Court. If the Court re-
views the evidence to determine whether there is any reasonable basis
to support the state finding, i.e., if this case is handled in a manner
similar to Schware and Konigsberg, it is suggested that the state
action would be upheld. However, it is also possible that the Court
51. Application of Patterson, 210 Ore. 495, 302 P.2d 227 (1956), cert. granted,
judgment vacated and case remanded, 353 U.S. 952 (1957). On rehearing, the
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed its former decision excluding Patterson from
admission to the bar and declared that the Schware and Konigsberg cases did not
compel a different result. Application of Patterson, 318 P.2d 907 (Ore. 1957).
52. Patterson joined the Communist Party in 1946, became a leader in the
state organization, and was finally expelled in 1949 for "disloyalty." Prior to
his expulsion, he had no idea of leaving the Party. He withheld this information
from the authorities at Northwestern College of Law in his application for admis-
sion in 1949. He also prevented inquiry into his political beliefs and associations
when called as a witness by the House Un-American Activities Committee.
53. 210 Ore. at 510-11, 302 P.2d at 234.
54. See note 51 supra.
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might decide that the state, by recognizing only one possible interpre-
tation of the aims and character of the Communist Party and by con-
cluding that any assertion to the contrary was a lie, acted arbitrarily
in finding that Patterson did not tell the truth. Considering the basis
on which applicant was excluded from the bar, it is doubtful that a
decision will be reached in terms of the real issues involved.
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